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• New launch vehicles have historically had 
significantly higher failure probabilities in early 
flights than what has been predicted using 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
• Work on a new methodology originally started with 
ARES I-X and Common Standards Working Group 
(CSWG) for range safety applications
• CSWG consists of the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), Air Force, and NASA
• Historical launch vehicle data was viewed as the 
best predictor of success/failure for launches of new 
vehicles.
Background and Motivation
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• A launch vehicle database was developed that 
includes all launches from 1980 - 2017 (both US and 
foreign)
• Entries to the database include: 
• Vehicle by model type
• Launch dates
• Failure description
• Failure Result (Loss Of Vehicle (LOV)/Loss Of 
Mission (LOM)
• Failure cause (when available)
• Vehicle designs (stages/engines/etc.)
Database Description
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• Database was 
reviewed to 
determine launch 
outcomes by flight 
sequence number 
for each launch 
vehicle model
Historical Launch Vehicle First Flight Risk
2nd Flight
1st Flight
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• First two flights had similar, high, failure probabilities
• Table below shows failures by design element based 
on first two flights
• Number of elements flown is based on vehicle 
designs from the database
Design Element Failure Probability
Design Element Failures Number of Design Elements Flown
Failure Probability per 
Design Element per 
Launch
Avionics 2 151 1.32E-02
1st Stage Liquid Engines 2 203 9.85E-03
Solid Propulsion 1 161 6.21E-03
Upper stage Liquid Engines 3 148 2.03E-02
Stage Separation 3 220 1.36E-02
Fairing Separation 3 149 2.01E-02
Thrust Vector Control 1 512 1.95E-03
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• Starting with the 
failure 
probabilities on 
previous page, 
the failure 
probabilities per 
element per 
launch by flight 
sequence 
number were 
estimated
Estimated Design Element Failure Probabilities by 
Flight Sequence Number
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• A hypothetical vehicle was evaluated using the data
• The basic design assumed for the new vehicle is 
shown below
Use of Data on a Hypothetical New Launch Vehicle
Basic Design Elements
Number of Stages 2
Fairing Separations 1
1st Stage Design Elements
Number of Liquid Engines 3
Number of Solid Motors 2
Upper Stage Design Elements
Number of Liquid Engines 2
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Design Element Design Element 
Failure Probability
# of Design 
Elements
Total Design Element 
Failure Probability
Avionics 1.32E-02 1 1.32E-02
1st Stage Liquid Engines 9.85E-03 3 2.93E-02
Solid Propulsion 6.21E-03 2 1.24E-02
Upper stage Liquid Engines 2.03E-02 2 4.01E-02
Stage Separation 1.36E-02 1 1.36E-02
Fairing Separation 2.01E-02 1 2.01E-02
Thrust Vector Control 1.95E-03 7 1.36E-02
Total 1.34E-01
• Based on the assumed design, the design element 
failure probabilities were found
• The estimated first flight failure probability is 0.134
Probability of Failure based on Design and Empirical 
Estimates
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• The previous example 
was extended to account 
for the assurance 
program
• Try to account for 
heritage hardware, 
extensive testing, etc.
• In the example assume 
credit is given to solid 
rocket motors, 2nd stage 
engines and thrust vector 
control.
• Credit assurance 
equivalent of 5 flights
Extending the Example to Account for the Assurance 
Program
9
Example Result with Assurance Program Credit
Design Element Design Element 
Failure Probability
Design Element
Equivalent 
Experience
Total Design Element 
Failure Probability
Avionics 1.32E-02 0 1.32E-02
1st Stage Liquid Engines 9.85E-03 0 2.93E-02
Solid Propulsion 6.21E-03 5 3.47E-03
Upper stage Liquid Engines 2.03E-02 5 4.89E-03
Stage Separation 1.36E-02 0 1.36E-02
Fairing Separation 2.01E-02 0 2.01E-02
Thrust Vector Control 1.95E-03 5 8.73E-03
Total 8.98E-02
• Crediting the 3 design elements with 5 flights each 
yields the below result
• The estimated failure probability per launch is reduced 
by 1/3.
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Conclusions
New launch vehicles have historically had a significantly higher 
average failure probability than mature launch vehicles, and PRA 
analyses do not adequately assess their failure probability. 
Assurance programs for launch vehicles have an impact on the 
success or failure probability of launch vehicles. By reviewing 
historical failures against assurance practices, greater confidence 
can be had for the first flight of a new vehicle and using this 
methodology can translate into a more accurate estimate of first 
flight failure probability and can be bridged into an existing PRA 
model. 
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Thank you for your attention!
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